Pragmatism has resurged explicitly in neopragmatism and implicitly in neurophilosophy. Neopragmatists have focused primarily on ideals, like human freedom, but at the expense of science. Neurophilosophers have focused primarily on scientific facts, but with an eye toward dismissing aspects of our self-conception like free will as illusory. In both cases, these resurgences are impoverished as each neglects what Dewey referred to as the method of intelligence. Neurophilosophical pragmatism -neuropragmatism -aims to overcome the deficiencies of neopragmatism and neurophilosophy by carrying forth the project of reconstruction by taking both the methods and results of experimental inquiry as the means for attaining ends-in-view such as human freedom.
Reconstruction is in the air. While working on this particular essay and its larger project, I was quite pleased to see Philip Kitcher's recent piece 1 inspired by John Dewey's book, Reconstruction in Philosophy.
2 Such clarion calls about the present and future state of philosophy often connect to Dewey. Such a call is particularly pressing in light of the enthusiasm and hype over the advances and promises of the neurosciences. Neuro-enthusiasts address the questions of everyday people that Kitcher argues professional philosophers have neglected. This philosophical work is being done often by those untrained in philosophy. Pragmatists should be concerning themselves with the consequences of neuroscience. I assert this for the following two reasons (which are by no means the only two). First, the advances that the neurosciences provide in our understanding of how we humans work reinforce and elucidate the conclusions of classical pragmatists. Second, these advances offer both solutions or the tools to effect solutions to human problems as well as new problems in need of philosophical attention. These problems range from the big questions, like what it means to be human, to more specific philosophical ones like free will, to concrete policy questions about the just treatment of convicted criminals.
That philosophers, especially pragmatists, have a responsibility in this situation to be both liaison officers between special disciplines as well as critics of a burgeoning neuro-culture should be of little doubt.
3 As Kitcher argues, the image of professional philosophy is suffering from a neglect of the big questions that people commonly see as philosophical. As Dewey argued, one of the most important tasks of philosophers is the reconstruction of our experience. The task of philosophy is to imagine new ways of engaging our world in light of both the image we traditionally have ourselves and the image(s) put forth by the sciences. This task is particularly urgent when it comes to the critique of our ideals, especially when it comes to the aims of inquiry in fields including but not limited to science, such as law and art. Neuro-enthusiasts have already started re-imagining what it means to be human. Pragmatists have not been as directly engaged in this discussion as one might hope. The reasons are myriad, but the resurgence of pragmatism over the past thirty years may shed light on how to move productively forward. Pragmatism has resurged explicitly in neopragmatism and implicitly in neurophilosophy. These two resurgences are impoverished descendants of classical pragmatism. The common thread is their neglect of Dewey's method of intelligence. Neopragmatists focus on ideals but neglect scientific fact. Neurophilosophers focus on scientific fact but often at the expense of ideals. An example of these different approaches is the problem of freedom. Neuroenthusiasts speak of a plausible neuro revolution in which a new type of freedom is just around the corner. Neopragmatists are eloquent when it comes to the value of human freedom. Neurophilosophers dismiss human freedom as illusory because of their interpretation of scientific facts. In any case, people may find themselves disappointed by the hype of neuro-enthusiasts, the lack of means of the neopragmatists, and the eliminativism of neurophilosophers. Pragmatists can do better -but only if neuroscientifically informed.
Neurophilosophical pragmatism emphasizes Dewey's method of intelligence as the means for reconstructing our lived experience in light of the advances of neuroscience. In order to set forth this larger project of reconstruction, I establish the need for philosophers to engage neuro-enthusiasts by examining two recent discussions of so-called neuro revolution. I then give a general overview of Deweyan reconstruction that focuses on experience as organic-environmental transaction, emphasizing his conceptions of situation and continuity. From there, I provide a historical sketch of the resurgence of pragmatism in its explicit and implicit forms before returning to a consideration of reconstruction in light of this resurgence. I conclude by imaging how a neuropragmatist views free will, where the standard philosophical question "do humans (really) have free will?" is rejected in favor of "how does human freedom work?"
Neurophilia, Neuro-enthusiasm, and the Big Questions
Many neurophiles talk about the promise of neuroscience in an explicitly philosophical manner. For example, the neuro-entrepreneur Zack Lynch writes in The Neuro Revolution that upon receiving life-altering medical treatment he
